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Author: Oliver Moore
Date: 20050128
Abu Mazen is Israel's Best Hope Against the Kassams
The Second Intifada is over, and Israel has won. The IDF and the Israeli security services have reached the point where they are preventing the vast majority of shooting and bombing attacks. Through the building of the security fence near the green line and the withdrawal from Gaza, Ariel Sharon's government is providing the basis for a permanent solution to the threat of such attacks, and hence a stable end to the Intifada. Hamas and other terrorist groups perceive the decreasing relevance of bombs and small arms, their most important strategic tool up till this point, and for this reason they have increased their reliance on Kassam rockets and mortars. The terrorists understand that Israel's unilateral withdrawal from Gaza forces them to devise a new way to attack Israel. Should they fail to do so, they would lose their strategic significance. After the unilateral withdrawal they will be deprived of their main asset vis a vis Israel: the ability to kill Israelis. Thus, Hamas and the other groups face a difficult choice: either find a new way of killing Israelis, or shift their anti-Israeli agitation to the political realm. Their adoption of the second option is precisely the long-term goal of both Bush and Sharon, but adopting it would entail a fundamental change in Hamas thinking. At this point, Hamas seems to be choosing the first option, which is why we have seen such an increase in their reliance on the Kassam rocket.
Try as it might, the IDF has been unable to stop all Kassam launchings. This raises a question for Israel: what does Israel do, after disengagement, if (or rather when) it gets hit by Kassams and mortars? This question is complicated by the fact that such artillery attacks are likely only to grow more, rather than less, sophisticated. This is where Abu Mazen and the Palestinian Authority become important. Abu Mazen, as chairman of his own terrorist organisation, the PLO, and president of the PA (Fatah's one-party state in the making) has to make a similar choice to Hamas's. But, unlike Hamas, he is far more inclined to travel the political route. Holding the highest position in the Palestinian political institutions, Abu Mazen is the most affected by international criticism and political pressure. Of all Palestinians, he is the most responsible to the Israelis, the Americans, and the rest of the International Community. This responsibility is normally part and parcel of being recognised as a national leader. Arafat's particular genius was for enjoying international legitimacy and prestige without ever actually being responsible to his international interlocutors; for many years, Arafat managed to have it both ways. But toward the end of his life, the US and Europe grew increasingly intolerant of this trick, and Abu Mazen would find the international climate inhospitable if he were to try such a manoeuvre now. In this sense, Israel has won the Second Intifada politically, as well as militarily.
So while Hamas is developing a new strategy based on rockets and missiles, Abu Mazen is increasingly accepting responsibility to the world and accepting to be bound by international norms. Furthermore, Abu Mazen knows that this year, the Israeli presence will be removed, and the PA and Hamas will have to determine between themselves whether Gaza becomes a de facto PA state dominated by Fatah, or a "Hamasland." No one but Hamas, Iran, and Syria wants the second option, and Abu Mazen, directing what the world now considers to be a legitimate political structure, is likely to gain the upper hand. And let us hope that he does, because otherwise Israel will have no reliable way of stopping the Kassam attacks. If Hamas maintains its underground, decentralised organisation and does not have to answer to the PA, Israel will continue to suffer from Kassam attacks, will constantly be forced to retaliate against them, and will lose the strategic initiative. If, however, Abu Mazen takes control and brings Hamas to heel, then Israel will have a responsible interlocutor.
Sharon's disengagement plan was originally conceived as purely unilateral
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